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ABSTRACT
Convergence in per capita income across countries turns on whether technological knowledge
spifiover are global or local. This paper estimates the amount of spifiover from R&D expenditures in major
industrialized countries on a geographic basis. A new data set is used which encompasses most of the
world's innovative activity at the industry-level between the years 1970 and 1995. First, I find that
technological knowledge is to a substantial degree local, not global, as the benefits from foreign spifiover
are declining with distance: on average, a 10% higher distance to a major technology-producing country
such as the U.S. is associated with a 0.15% lower level of productivity. Second, technological knowledge
has become more global over the sample period. As a determinant of productivity, foreign R&D has
significantly gained in importance relative to domestic R&D, and the extent to which knowledge spifiover
decline with distance has fallen by 20%. The finding of a falling but still high degree of localization has






keller@eco.utexas.eduInternational convergence in per capita income turns on whether the scope of technological knowl-
edge spillover is global or local. Global spillover favor convergence, while a geographically limited
scope of knowledge difftision can lead to regional clusters of countries with persistently different levels
of output per capita. Thus, whether the industrialized countries of the North and West will remain
the rich permanently, or whether less developed countries will catch up hinges on whether knowledge
spillover are global or local.
According to a widely held view, technological knowledge is truly global, because increasing
economic interdependence as well as new means of telecommunications and the internet ensure that
people in all countries have access to the same pooi of technological knowledge. Even differences in
the technology that is actually employed (as documented in Harrigan 1997, e.g.) are consistent with a
global pooi of technology if the rate of complementary human and physical capital investments or the
incentive to adopt new technology varies across countries.1 Alternatively, technological knowledge
could be to some extent local. Helsinki, for instance, is located about 1,500 miles away from Bonn,
around 6,900 miles from Washington, D.C., and 7,800 miles from Tokyo, while the distance from
Canberra to Bonn, Washington, and Tokyo is 16,500, 16,000, and 8,000 miles, respectively. If
knowledge spillover are local, then productivity in Finland should, ceteris paribus, be lower than in
Australia, because the former is closer than the latter to Germany, the U.S., and Japan, the three
countries that account for more than 75% of the world's spending on research and development
(R&D).
I will investigate whether knowledge spillover are global or local by examining whether the dis-
tance between countries affects the magnitude of productivity gains from each others' R&D spending.
Geographic distance should not matter for international technology diffusion if there is a global pool
of technological knowledge or a country's technology level depends only on idiosyncratic non-spatial
'These points are emphasized by Mankiw (1995) and Prescott (1998), respectively.
1factors. If knowledge spillover are to some extent local, however, this matters beyond its implications
for international convergence for the following questions.
First, it determines the long-run effectiveness of macroeconomic policies that aim at raising a
country's rate of technical change. With perfect international technology diffusion, one country's
R&D subsidies would have the same effect on domestic growth as everywhere else in the world.
A change in the rate of technical progress at the national level would have then no impact on a
country's position in the long-run world ranking either. Moreover, if spillover are global, the public
good nature of such policies would raise the question of how to insure that national policies will be
at the efficient level, given the incentive of all countries to free-ride on the efforts of other countries.
Second, technology differences affect the comparative advantage and trade of countries (e.g.,
Trefler 1995). If technology diffusion is influenced by geographic factors, then also production func-
tions and comparative advantage will vary systematically according to location, thereby influencing
the trade patterns of the countries. This work on the geographic scope of technology diffusion will
thus provide important information for future work on dynamic models of trade and comparative
advantage such as proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1991).
Third, it matters for regional and urban economics, where a major concern for a long time has
been to explain the agglomeration and the dispersion of economic activity across locations. By ex-
plicitly modeling transport costs, recent work on economic geography such as Krugman and Venables
(1995) and Fujita et al. (1999) has explained these phenomena through the interaction of pecuniary
externalities and increasing returns to scale. When geographic factors affect the diffusion of knowl-
edge, localized technological externalities are an alternative explanation of economic agglomeration
and dispersion.2 Both explanations rely on geographic factors that relate the costs of transporting
2See the path-dependence results by Feenstra (1996) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 8).
2goods or transmitting knowledge to distance.3 Estimating the spatial patterns of technology diffusion
helps to assess the importance of geographic factors in explaining agglomeration and dispersion. It
will also be useful for future research that identifies the exact nature of spatial externalities.
My approach follows a substantial amount of work showing that the link between R&D expendi-
tures in one industry and productivity in another is best viewed as a process of technology diffusion
(Scherer 1984, Griliches 1995). The theoretical framework underlying my estimates—presented in Ap-
pendix A—illustrates this mechanism between countries. I relate R&D spending in France, Germany,
Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. (which I will refer to as the G-5 countries) to the productivity levels in
nine other OECD countries. The first question is whether the magnitude of the productivity effects
from G-5 country R&D depends on the bilateral geographic distance between technology sender and
recipient country. A second question is whether these effects, if they exist, have become stronger or
weaker over time.
Influential recent work in the area includes Jaffe et al. (1993) and Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998).
These authors have studied technology diffusion by comparing the location of patent citations with
that of the cited patents, showing that U.S. patents are significantly more often cited by other
U.S. patents than by foreign patents. These papers succeed in isolating the flow of technological
knowledge by focusing on patent citations, but do not assess the economic impact of technology
diffusion in terms of output or productivity.4 Also Eaton and Kortum (1999, 1996) use data on
patenting to estimate their country-level models of technology diffusion and productivity growth.
Their diffusion parameter estimates confirm that technology diffusion is geographically localized in
the sense that there is more within- than between-country diffusion. However, what identifies the
diffusion parameters is that there is more patenting within- than across countries. In contrast, my
3The two mechanisms need not be exclusive. See, e.g., the theoretical framework in Appendix A.
4See also Bottazzi and Pen (1999) who examine patenting in European regions.
3estimates on geography effects in technology diffusion are based directly on the distance between
countries, not indirectly through a mechanism such as patenting which is known to be correlated
with distance.
Other authors have studied productivity effects from both domestic and foreign R&D in a pro-
duction function framework, typically estimating that the effect from domestic R&D is stronger than
that from foreign R&D (Coe and Helpman 1995, Keller 1999a). This is consistent with the geographic
localization of technology diffusion. However, the main focus in these papers is to evaluate the im-
portance of a particular mechanism—international trade—as a conduit of technology diffusion. Here,
I take a broader empirical approach, asking whether knowledge spillover are global or local without
testing a particular model. Moreover, by exploiting cross-sectional variation in the relative distance
of countries to their partner countries rather than distinguishing only between domestic and foreign
R&D, my estimates are the first on international technology diffusion that are based on a relatively
rich geographic structure.5
More generally, other recent work including Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Hanson (1998) has
pointed to important geographic localization effects. The former find that productivity is positively
correlated with the density of economic activity in the United States, while the latter obtains an
estimate of the geographic scope of backward and forward trade linkages by estimating a spatial
labor demand function for the United States. Neither paper is concerned with the geographic scope
of knowledge spillover. In contrast, I will analyze knowledge spillover on a geographic basis by
exploiting the variation of productivity effects from foreign R&D as the relative location of technology
sender and recipient countries varies.
5Branstetter (1998) studies international technology diffusion between the U.S. and Japan with firm-level data; see
also the related work by Bernstein and Mohnen (1998) and Nadiri and Kim (1996). Adams and Jaffe (1996) study
geographic effects for domestic technology diffusion, estimating the effects of knowledge spillover among plants of the
same firm in the U.S. chemicals industry between 1974-88. They find that the productivity-enhancing effects of parent
firm R&D are significantly smaller for plants that are relatively far away than for plants that are relatively nearby.
4In the next section, I provide an overview of the empirical setting by discussing the variation of
R&D, bilateral distance, and productivity in my sample. Based on a model of trade, transportation
costs, and growth which is described in Appendix A, section 2 presents the estimation equation
and discusses major estimation issues. All estimation results can be found in section 3. The first
set of results concerns the existence of localization effects, while the second documents whether
technological knowledge has become more or less global over time. The concluding section 4 contains
a summary and further discussion of the results. Appendix B provides some additional discussion
of estimation issues, while a description of the sources and the construction of the productivity and
R&D data can be found in Appendix C and D, respectively.
1 Empirical setting
This section takes an extended look at the data that I will employ below. Although much is already
known about these countries and industries, the context provided by this overview will throw some
important new light on how productivity, distance, and R&D expenditures in the sample vary.
1.1 Major country and industry characteristics in terms of GDP and R&D
I use data on manufacturing industries in fourteen OECD countries for the years 1970-1995. The
input, output, and price data come from the STAN database, OECD (1998a). The source for R&D
expenditure data is OECD (1998b). Manufacturing industries in the fourteen countries of my sample
have accounted for about 18% of world GDP and approximately 76% of world GDP in manufacturing
in 1980, and capture thus an important part of the world economy during this period. Moreover,
R&D expenditures by these countries constitute at least 90% of the world's total innovative activity
and almost all private R&D in the manufacturing sector for these years.
The included countries are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Italy,
5Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The
analysis encompasses almost all of manufacturing, subdivided into twelve industries at the two- to
three-digit ISIC level.6 These are food, beverages and tobacco (ISIC 31), textiles, apparel, and
leather (ISIC 32), wood products and furniture (ISIC 33), paper and printing (ISIC 34), chemicals
and drugs (ISIC 351+352), rubber and plastics (ISIC 355+356), non-metallic mineral products (ISIC
36), basic metals (ISIC 37), metal products (ISIC 381), non-electrical machinery and instruments
(ISIC 382+385), electrical machinery (ISIC 383), and transportation equipment (ISIC 384). Table
1 provides summary statistics on the relative size of the countries and industries in terms of GDP.
While the size of the countries varies substantially in terms of GDP, it does so even more in terms
of R&D expenditures. Table 2 reports summary statistics. The G-5 countries (France, Germany,
Japan, the U.K. and the U.S.) conduct 93% of the total R&D in the sample, while their share of
manufacturing GDP is only 74%. In the light of their dominant position, I will treat the G-5 countries
as the only sources of foreign technology. Moreover, because the effects from foreign R&D might be
very different in the G-5 and the non-G-5 countries, I will focus on the productivity effects of G-5
R&D in the other nine countries.
Also the cross-industry variation is higher for R&D than for GDP. Most of the R&D is done in
chemicals, machinery, electronics, and transportation, accounting for a total of 87% of all R&D. An
increase in R&D activity in these four industries amounts to a major change in national technological
trends, which might, through inter-industry spillover, stimul ate R&D and raise productivity in other
industries as well. In that case, the relationship between R&D and productivity in the low-R&D
industries would be jointly caused by changes in R&D investments of the high-R&D industries. This
would lead to inconsistent estimates in my empirical analysis. Below, I will provide thus two sets
6Two industries have been dropped from the sample: ISIC 353+354, Petroleum and Refineries, because of relatively
bad data, and ISIC 39, Other Manufacturing, because it includes rather different products across countries.
6of results: for all twelve industries, and for the eight low-R&D industries. If the estimation results
for both samples are similar, the estimation bias due to such simultaneity is likely to be limited.7
R&D expenditures are transformed to stocks with the perpetual inventory method (see Appendix
D). Table 3 shows that the average annual growth rates of R&D stocks vary substantially by country,
from a high of 9.8% for Italy to a low of 4.8% for Finland. Among the G-5 countries, R&D growth
has been highest in Germany (9.9%) and lowest in the U.K. (3.0%), with the U.S. in between (5.3%).
1.2 The relative location of the countries
The distance data in this paper is miles between the capital cities of the countries, as the crow flies
(from Haveman 1998). Table 4 presents the distance data from the G-5 countries to the nine other
OECD countries. Broadly speaking, three types of countries can be distinguished: (1) European
countries, which are relatively close to the U.K., France, and Germany, about 6,000 miles away from
the U.S., and around 9,000 miles away from Japan; (2) Canada, which is close to the U.S., about
5,500 miles away from the European G-5 countries, and about 10,000 miles away from Japan; and
Australia, which is around 16,500 miles away from all G-5 countries except for Japan, which is about
8,000 miles away. This means that I seek to estimate whether international technology diffusion is
geographically localized from a relatively small and non-contiguous set of countries.
1.3 Multi-lateral total factor productivity indices
I will compare industry-level total factor productivity (TFP) for the nine non-G-5 countries in my
sample. Recent work with similar comparisons for other purposes includes Bernard and Jones (1996),
Harrigan (1997) and Griffith et al. (1999). TFP calculations require real, internationally comparable
data on outputs, inputs, and intermediate goods. At the industry level, data exists only for labor
possible reasons for simultaneity exist as well. In section 2 and Appendix B I discuss how these are addressed.
7and physical capital, not for intermediate inputs. Therefore, the TFP calculations in this paper
should be viewed as approximations to the true TFP measures. I employ the multi-lateral TFP









where c =1,...,C;i1, ...,I;t =1,...,T;c indexes country, i indexes industry, and t is the subscript
for time. The variable Z is gross output, L is labor inputs, and K denotes capital inputs. Further,
lnis average output, given by ln Z = inZt; correspondingly, in L2 => lnand
in K2 ln Kdt. The variable 5jt is an average of labor cost shares, öjt = (at+Ot), where
aC2t,Vc, i,t, isthecost share of labor, and jtisits country average, öjt => it• FollowingHall
(1990), I use cost-based factor shares, since these are, in contrast to revenue-based factor shares,
correct even in absence of constant returns to scale.8 This TFP index is superlative in the sense that
it is exact for the flexible translog functional form. It is also transitive, so that the choice of the base
country does not matter.
1.3.1 Input-utilization adjustments
Figure 1 shows the average indices for Australia, Italy, and Sweden.9 Because these indices are
relative to the country average for a given year, they do not increase as productivity increases over
time in all countries. The upward trend in the two series for Italy, for instance, means that Italian
TFP was rising relative to the mean of the nine OECD countries over this period. There are two
series for each country, one adjusted and one unadjusted, because the OECD has not taken account
of differences in labor and capital utilization. I have adjusted the data in the following way: the
8 costshares incorporate country-specific information on the user cost of capital based on the international
comparison project of Jorgenson and Landau (1993a); see Appendix C.
9These are unweighted industry averages. Size-weighted averages behave very similar.
8number of employees in the STAN data base is multiplied by the average annual hours worked in
each country's manufacturing sector, from OECD (1999). The actual usage of capital inputs has
been estimated by generating capital stock series which adjust for cyclical factors; see Appendix C
for details.
Figure 1 indicates that these adjustments are important. The productivity of Swedish industries
is substantially underestimated if the relatively low number of annual working hours is not taken into
account: on average between 1970 and 1995, the unadjusted value of relative TFP is -0.16, whereas
the adjusted value is -0.03. The opposite is the case for Australia, where manufacturing employees
work relatively long hours, and thus the adjusted TFP index is considerably below the unadjusted
TFP index. These differences in input usage vary also over time, making it impossible to capture
them by time-invariant fixed effects. For instance, in Italy input usage was above the mean until
1981 so that the adjusted TFP index is above the unadjusted index, while from 1981 on Italian input
usage was slightly below the sample average. The adjusted data is preferred to the unadjusted data
for the purpose of comparing productivity across countries, and I will hence use it in my benchmark
specifications. However, I will also present basic specifications using unadjusted data to examine the
robustness of my findings.
1.3.2Averageproductivity by country over time
Figure 2 shows the country averages of the productivity indices for the nine sample countries plus
the U.S., which has been the productivity leader throughout the period of 1970-95 according to my
estimates.10 First, the figure clearly indicates that the constructed indices are noisy measures of
the true productivity in these countries. For instance, average productivity in Spain in the year of
10This as well as the following analysis is based on the input utilization-adjusted TFP data. Without these adjust-
ments, U.S. productivity tends to be relatively higher, due to the relatively high number of annual hours worked in the
U.S. compared with the most advanced European countries.
91985 was substantially higher than in both 1984 and 1986 according to Figure 2. A data problem
is the most plausible explanation for that. Second, while the productivity advantage of the United
States as the leader has fallen over the twenty-six years, there is no strong tendency of productivity
convergence among the nine countries. In Figure 3, I compare the productivity rank average of
countries in 1970 and 1995. High-performing countries are close to lower left corner (Netherlands
and Canada) while low-performing countries are close to the upper right corner (Denmark, Spain,
and Finland). Countries above the 45 degree line have fallen behind in the productivity ranking
between 19'70 and 1995, while those below the 45-degree line have gained. As indicated by the
vertical distance to the 45-degree line, the largest absolute change in productivity has occurred in
Italy, which gained more than three ranks on average. Also Norway's relative productivity increased
substantially. Australia lost the highest number of ranks, with 2.58, while Canada is a close second
(-2.5 ranks). Australia is also the most-remotely located country in the sample. Thus the drop
in Australia's ranking is consistent with the idea that it has fallen back due to technology that is
geographically localized in the vicinity of the G-5 countries. At the same time, less-remotely located
Denmark has also fallen back over this period, suggesting that there are also other major factors
explaining productivity performance.
1.3.3 The industry dimension: with-in country productivity convergence
This paper analyzes productivity dynamics at the industry level, which is important because the
country average of the productivity levels masks a considerable amount of heterogeneity at the in-
dustry level. In fact, in 1970, a country is often productivity leader (rank 1) in one industry and
at the same time productivity laggard (rank 9) in another industry. The average of the countries'
TFP rank ranges in 1970 is seven (out of a maximum spread of eight). Over time, this spread has
fallen, and by 1995, the average of the TFP rank range is down to five. This trend is confirmed by
10Figure 4. The downward-sloping series is the average of the with-in country TFP standard deviation
over time. Clearly, there is a trend towards with-in country convergence of productivity over these
twenty-six years: on average, high productivity countries were able to improve productivity in their
relatively low-performing industries, while low productivity countries lost ground even in their rela-
tively high-performing industries. Correspondingly, there is cross-country divergence of productivity,
as indicated by the upward-sloping series which is the standard deviation of the TFP country aver-
ages over time. This is an important finding. In general, it suggests that country-specific components
in accounting for productivity differences have become more important over the sample period. Put
differently, an increasing share of what leads to relatively good productivity performance appears to
be associated with country- rather than with industry-characteristics. This is consistent with several
possibilities. One is that strong domestic inter-industry spillover lead to uniform productivity levels
across industries while there is no international technology diffusion at all. This might be called
the complete localization scenario. It is also consistent with an increasing importance of foreign
technology sources, where countries benefit from it to a varying degree, depending on their relative
location. I will now turn to an empirical specification to examine this further.
2 Empirical model and estimation issues
There are various reasons why international technology diffusion might be related to geographic
distance. My empirical analysis does not support or reject a particular theory. For concreteness,
though, I have laid out in Appendix A a two-country model of growth and trade with transport costs
that gives rise to the type of effect that will be considered in the following. The model implies that
domestic total factor productivity F, defined as output divided by factor-share weighted capital- and
11labor inputs, is given, at a given point in time, by
=lnA+ ln (Ni_a + N(D)), (2)
where the parameter c,0<c<1, is the cost share of labor, and A is a country-specific constant. The
term N (Nt) is the existing range of domestic (foreign) intermediate products, which is proportional
to cumulative R&D and an index of the countries' level of technological knowledge, and (D) is
decreasing in the bilateral geographic distance (denoted D) between the domestic and the foreign
economy. I will focus on estimating versions of equation (2), which contains the key prediction of
interest: equation (2) says that domestic productivity is positively related to cumulative domestic
as well as distance-deflated foreign R&D.
In section 3 below, I will use industry-level data for major OECD countries to estimate this
relationship. The specification is as follows:
lnFjt st+( +et,Vc,i,t. (3)
\g€G5 J
Here, S denotes cumulative R&D spending, g is an index for the group of G-5 countries (France,
Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S.), and D is the bilateral geographic distance between
country c and country g. The aj, at,/3,'y, and 6 are parameters to be estimated, and Ejj is an error
term whose properties I discuss below. The parameters a captures differences in A across industries,
while the term eö'cgcapturesthe distance term (D) in equation (2) above. The parameter /3 is
related to the elasticity of productivity with respect to own R&D, while 'y determines the strength
of the productivity effect from foreign R&D.
The parameter 6 is of central interest in this paper, as it captures the degree of localization of
R&D. This parameter, which I will refer to as the distance parameter, is identified from variation
12of the productivity effects of G-5 R&D in other countries conditional on bilateral distance. Denote
as effective foreign R&D from country g. Positive estimates of S mean that variation in
productivity levels can be better explained by assuming that effective R&D from countries located
relatively far away is smaller than that of other countries located relatively more closely. If foreign
R&D raises domestic productivity ('y positive), then positive estimates of 5suggestthat the benefits
from foreign technology creation are decreasing with distance. This is the sense in which I will inves-
tigate whether international technology diffusion is geographically localized. In contrast, estimating
S =0would mean that distance does not matter, and S <0 would be consistent with the strength
of technology diffusion being inversely related to distance.
While the existence of localization effects is the first major issue I will investigate, the second issue
is whether the degree of localization of knowledge spillover has changed over time during my sample
period. A priori, the fall in communication costs and other factors might suggest that technological
knowledge has become more global during these years. To investigate whether this is the case, I will
therefore allow the distance parameter to vary from the subperiod of 1970-82 to that from 1983-95
in the second set of estimations.
Two major estimation issues need to be confronted." First, there is relatively little variation in
bilateral distance in my sample. This will make it relatively difficult to obtain precise estimates of the
parameter S. Moreover, three of the G-5 and seven out of the nine other OECD countries are located
in Europe. This could cause problems if the relations to European versus to non-European countries
are very different in nature. To partly address the concern that international technology diffusion
across different bilateral relations might be heterogeneous, I will present also distance parameters
that vary by G-5 country. In addition, I will report results for the subsample of European countries.
To the extent that these specifications lead to similar results, the relatively limited and particular
following issues are further discussed in Appendix B.
13set of bilateral relations cannot be critical for my results.
The second concern in estimating equation (3) is that the error term is not orthogonal to the
regressors, because any correlation would lead to inconsistent estimates. The disturbances capture
idiosyncratic factors that affect measured productivity. Some could be industry-specific, such as
receiving strong inter-industry spillover, and others might be common to all industries in a given
country, such as shocks affecting the national business cycle. Using instrumental-variable estimation
would be one solution to this. However, good instruments for R&D expenditures are here not
available. Instead, I try to minimize the effects of simultaneity through my choice of specification.
First, in constructing the TFP indices I have imposed a substantial amount of structure that should
reduce simultaneity problems (see Appendix C). Second, real R&D is computed using an economy-
wide deflator, whereas industry-specific deflators are used in the construction of the productivity
indices. Third, my output measure is gross production and not value added, which reduces the
likelihood of obtaining spurious regression results (see Basu and Fernald 1995).
Fourth, I focus on the productivity effects of G-5 R&D in other industrialized countries. This
relationship is not as likely subject to common shocks as the relation of R&D and productivity
in the same country. Further, by including domestic R&D expenditures in the equation I control
for an important determinant of productivity that could induce simultaneity. Fifth, the estimation
equations include time fixed effects (ct) which control for shocks that affect the entire sample in a
given year. Lastly, the country-by-industry fixed effects cj control for time-invariant factors that
generate a spurious correlation between the error terms and the regressors. These capturedifferences
in the average productivity levels which might be due to various factors other than the geographic
localization of technological knowledge, but which are omitted in my analysis. I now turn to the
estimation results.
143 Estimation Results
I first present estimation results for equation (3). The estimation method is non-linear least squares.
The dependent variable is the log relative productivity level as defined by equation (1). The regressors
are fixed effects for each year and for each country-by-industry combination, the domestic R&D
stock, and the R&D stocks of the C-S countries interacted with the bilateral geographic distance as
described above. For the following estimations and simulations, I normalize distance so that D= 1
is equal to 235 miles, the smallest bilateral distance in my sample (between the Netherlands and
Germany). This choice of units does not affect the size of the estimated elasticities.
3.1 Basic results
The results for equation (3) are shown in Table 5, column 1. Heteroskedasticity-consistent boot-
strapped standard errors are shown in parentheses.12 The productivity effect from domestic R&D,
j3, is estimated with /3= 0.054.The corresponding elasticity is equal to e =/3Ad,where Ad is
between zero and one and increasing in domestic R&D.'3 The average elasticity is equal to 0.018,
with a standard deviation of 0.017.14Theparameter 7 measures the average productivity effect from
distance-weighted C-S country R&D relative to domestic R&D; it is positively estimated at 1.219.
The parameter estimate of 6 is equal to 0.495. This estimate suggests that effective R&D from
12Also standard errors based on standard first-order asymptotics have been computed, but I found the bootstrapped
standard errors to be more reliable. The non-linearity in 6 seems to make the truncation of the distribution of
parameters at the second-order less reasonable. Moreover, except for the parameter y, the standard errors based on first-
order asymptotics tend to be considerably smaller (often about 30%), so I report the more conservative bootstrapped
standard errors. They are generated through block-wise resampling from the empirical error distribution, allowing
for 108 different blocks, which corresponds to a potentially different variance for each country-by-industry pair. See
Andrews (1999) for references and further results. I have also considered the possibility of spatial correlation among the
disturbances. However, the covariance of fitted residuals among European countries, e.g., is not significantly different
from the covariance of errors between European and non-European countries. This suggests that spatial correlation
effects are not very strong.
elasticity varies by country,by industry,and over time;itsdefinitionis =
Scit/+ (9€ ,Vc, i,t.
"Industry-levelestimates of this elasticity have often been higher that that, but this difference is probably largely
due to the fact that in contrast to many earlier studies, I use TFP relative to the sample mean as the dependent
variable (see Griliches 1995 for a broader survey).
15G-5 countries is falling with geographic distance. The finding is consistent with the localization
hypothesis: productivity in countries that are far away from the G-5 countries is lower than in those
located more closely, because technology diffusion and its productivity effects are geographically lo-
calized. How important are these effects? Figure 5 shows the total effective R&D from the technology
sender point of view, for each G-5 country. While U.S. R&D is more than six times that of Germany,
due to its relatively close location to a number of countries in my sample, effective German R&D
is estimated to be slightly larger than effective U.S. R&D (34% versus 33%, respectively). For the
U.K. and France I obtain shares of 18% and 15%, respectively, while Japan's share is not even 1% of
the total effective R&D. Given G-5 country R&D, the effective G-5 R&D stocks are thus inversely
related to the average distance to the sample countries: from the last row in Table 4, on average,
Japan is almost three times the distance of Germany away from the sample countries.
Figure 6 shows the totals for the nine technology receiving countries. Total effective foreign
R&D for the Netherlands is estimated to be highest (33%), followed by Canada (32%) and Denmark
(12%). Among the European countries, effective foreign R&D is lowest in Finland (2%),while I
estimate the lowest effective foreign R&D for Australia (close to 0%). The results suggest that the
combined effect from three relatively small but near-by G-5 countries leads to a higher stock for the
Netherlands than for Canada, even though the latter is close to the major R&D conducting country
in the world, the United States. Another point to note is that even the difference between effective
foreign R&D in the Netherlands or Denmark, which are located at the core of Europe,and Finland,
which is on Europe's periphery, is substantial.
Figure 7 presents the full bilateral breakdown for all 9 x 5 effective foreignR&D stocks. The largest
individual effect is that of the U.S. in Canada, followed by the German, U.K., and Frencheffects
in the Netherlands. At the other extreme, only Japanese R&D benefits Australia to a significant
amount, and even here, the effective Japanese R&D is much smaller than Australia's ownR&D stock.
16Essentially, the estimates suggest that Australia does not benefit from foreign R&D at all, which
might be too strong a result; I return to this point in section 4 below. Figure 8 is also based on these
estimates. The different levels and sources of foreign technology for the Netherlands, Australia, and
Canada are captured by the size and shape of the pentagons in the graph.
The elasticity of productivity in country c with respect to R&D in G-5 country g is closely related
to the size of the effective foreign R&D stock from that country; it is given by Ecg= i3A,where A'g
is between zero and one and increasing in effective R&D from country g.'5 The elasticity estimates
range from close to =0.054for U.S. R&D in Canada to almost zero for, e.g., the productivity
elasticity of German R&D in Australia. The average is 0.007, varying strongly across bilateral pairs,
with a standard deviation of 0.011. I have computed the elasticity of productivity with respect to
distance (Din F/3 in D)toillustrate the influence of distance according to these estimates. This
elasticity, denoted ,isrelated to the elasticity with respect to foreign R&D in the following way:
=c1g X(S) X Dcg.Theaverage (standard deviation) of the distance elasticity is equal to -0.015
(0.02). The estimates therefore suggest that doubling the distance to a G-5 country is on average
associated with 1.5% lower productivity.
In column two of Table 5 I report the results from estimating equation (3) with only the rela-
tively low-R&D industries. Any remaining simultaneity problem should be substantially reduced by
focusing on these industries. The sample size is now one third lower. Relative to the full sample,
I estimate a lower maximum domestic R&D elasticity'6 and a stronger effect from foreign R&D,
while the distance parameteris again estimated to be positive. I also estimate equation (3) with
Australia and Canada dropped from the sample, which reduces the sample size by 22%. Australia
definition is given by A9 =S9te6 /+ s9i , vc,i, t, g.
16Because the industry elasticity s is related to the return to R&D, p, by e, =x , Vi,if arbitrage equalizes
the return to R&D across industries (p =p,Vi), then e varies with S. This could explain the drop of the maximum
elasticity e from 0.054 to 0.039 for the low-R&D industries in column two.
17might be a special case due to its extremely remote location relative to all G-5 countries, and Canada
might be special because of its location adjacent to the U.S. which does the majority of all R&D
in the world. Without Australia and Canada, the distance parameter is primarily identified from
the relative strength of R&D originating in European G-5 countries versus the strength of U.S. and
Japanese R&D in seven European countries. From the estimates, it is clear that the magnitude of
the domestic R&D effect /3issensitive to the exclusion of Australia and Canada. The localization
parameter (5 is still estimated to be positive and not very different from that in the full sample.17
The last four columns in Table 5 provide some sensitivity analysis. In columns four and five
I present results based on TFP indices that are only partially or not at all adjusted for input
utilization. The main difference is that /3 is estimated to be 40% larger. This suggests that one picks
up a substantial amount of spurious correlation when cyclical effects thataffect both input utilization
and R&D are not controlled for. Because both the foreign R&D elasticity as well as the distance
elasticity are proportional to /3, also these elasticities would be overestimated without adjusting for
input utilization. Assuming a R&D depreciation rate of 0% instead of 10% leads to a higher domestic
R&D effect estimate (see column 6 of Table 5) •18Finally,in column 7 of Table 5 I present results
for correlating productivity in period t with R&D in period t —1.Tn that case, the R&D stocks are
pre-determined. If these results would vary substantially from my earlier estimates, it would mean
that simultaneity might continue to play an important role. The regression results suggest that this
is not the case.
While my estimates for (5 are all consistent with the localization hypothesis, the estimates of /3
and are not fully robust across all specifications: /3dependson whether Australia and Canada are
'7Since the R&D and distance elasticities are proportional to 3, they are somewhat lower for the specifications in
column 2 and 3 of Table 5 compared to the benchmark specification of column 1. In column 2 (3, respectively), I obtain
the following average elasticities: e =0.007(0.005), r =0.006(0.005), and e =—0.011(—0.008).
'8A R&D depreciation rate of 0% is sometimes assumed to be the 'true' social rate of knowledge depreciation. Ceteris
par-i bus, a lower rate of R&D depreciation implies faster growth of the R&D stocks, which, for a given returnto R&D,
implies a higher R&D elasticity. Thus, the higher estimate ofis consistent with that.
18in the sample, and 'y appears to be at times only weakly identified. One reason for this might be that
specification (3) does not include G-5 country-specific parameters, which might be overly restrictive.
I therefore estimate in the following section a specification which allows the distance parameter to
vary by G-5 country.
3.2 Distance effects varying by G-5 country
Consider the following generalization of equation (3):
lnF = + + 1n Sj + ( + it,Vc,i,t. (4)
\g€G5 /
The distance parameter is now allowed to vary by G-5country,6g,Vg. The results for this specification
are summarized in Table 6. While the estimate of 3 is similar to the corresponding regression in
Table 5, 'y is now higher than before. The distance parameters 8g are all larger than zero, consistent
with the localization hypothesis. Even though the 8 vary substantially, the increase in explained
variation in productivity levels due to this is very small, and a likelihood ratio test cannot reject the
null hypothesis that '5g =8,Vg. However, according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and
other standard model selection criteria, the less restricted model (4) of Table 6 is preferred to that
with a common distance parameter.'9 As will become clear below, it is also the more robust model.
I will therefore consider specification (4) further.
The higher estimate of 'y suggests a higher elasticity with respect to foreign R&D, which I find
to be the case; in contrast, the average distance elasticityfalls by a third.20 The estimates of
6, range between circa 0.2 for Germany to 0.85 for France. The standard errors suggest that all
19Akaike's Information Criterion is defined as: AIC =In()+2,wheree'e is the residual sum of squares, n is
the number of observations, and K is the number of estimated parameters. A lower value of AIC indicates a preferred
model. The AIC penalizes the loss of degrees of freedom more heavily than the adjusted R2, see Greene (1993, 244f.).
20The mean of the foreign R&D elasticityrises from 0.007 to 0.008. The average distance elasticity s' varies
strongly across bilateral pairs, ranging between zero and —8.4%, with a standard deviation of 0.017,
19distance parameters are quite precisely estimated, but some of them are more fragile than they
appear: Japan's coefficient, e.g., is solely identified from the differential effect of Japanese R&D
in Australia (where it is positive) and in the other eight countries (where it is essentially equal to
zero). This suggests that the estimate of 5jdependsconsiderably on whether Australia is included
in the sample or not. The results reported below confirm that. Moreover, the distance parameter
for Germany,is not always the smallest of the G-5 countries, as it is here.
Column 2 in Table 6 reports the results of estimating (4) with the low-R&D industries only.
In contrast to the common-5 specification of Table 5, now the estimates of 'y and 6g remain fairly
similar. Column 3 of Table 6 shows the results for the case when Australian and Canadian industries
are dropped from the sample. As in the common-6 specification of Table 5, this leads to a substan-
tially lower estimate of,@. The relative foreign R&D effect 'y is estimated not too different from the
estimate for the full sample, but some uncertainty about the magnitude of 'y remains. The distance
parameters for the European G-5 countries are not very well identified, despite the relatively small
standard errors. This is because the bilateral distance to all seven European countries is rather
similar (especially for centrally located Germany). The estimate of 5jdrops,which is primarily due
to the exclusion of Australia from the sample. Japan, which is the most-closely located G-5 country
for Australia, generates relatively stronger R&D effects in Australia than elsewhere, but once only
European countries are left in the sample, there is not sufficient variation to identify a differential
productivity effect across countries.21 The specification with lagged R&D in column 4 gives results
similar to the benchmark specification in column 1.
Iii unreported results, I have also estimated the specification (4) with partially adjusted and
unadjusted TFP, as well as for a R&D depreciation rate of 0%. The results are qualitatively similar.
21Also note that in contrast to the specifications in columns 1 and 2, here Akaike's Criterion favors the more
constrained model of Table 5.
20As a further specification check, I have allowed the parameter 'y to vary by G-5 country (as in
')/9S9e'-'-9),with either a common S or with the 5's varying by G-5country.While the distance
parameters remain larger than zero, there is no evidence that 'y varies significantly by G-5 country. I
have also employed a different functional form for the distance effects, estimating 5 in the modified
effective foreign R&D expression S96C9.ForO<5 < 1, this is decreasing in distance D,whereasfor
values of S > 1 it is increasing in distance. Consistent with the localization hypothesis, I estimate
5 between zero and one and usually close to the corresponding e.
3.3 Localization effects over time
In this section I report results that indicate whether the technology localization effect has become
stronger or weaker over time. The following specification will be used:
ln Fdt = ai + t+ln 8cit +(Sgit_ög(1+Tt)Dcg+ t, Vc, i, t, (5)
\gG5 J
whereT is equal to zero for the years 1970-82 and equal to one for 1983-95. A positive value
of L' indicates that technology created in the G-5 countries has a geographically more localized
productivity effect over time. In the benchmark specification—see column 1 in Table 7—, I estimate
= —0.505, which suggests that the degree of localization has fallen since the 1970s. This is
consistent with the notion that technological knowledge has become more global over these twenty-
six years. Compared to the analogous specification in Table 6, the inclusion of the time dummy leads
to a higher estimate of /3 and 5G and a lower estimate of öus, with otherwise similar results. The
AIC model selection criterion indicates that the specification with time effect is marginally preferred
to that without time effect. The estimate of suggests that on average, the G-5 distancecoefficients
have fallen by about 50%. This means that effective foreign R&D, has generally been
21higher in the later subperiod, and has led to an increase in the average foreign R&D elasticity ef
relative to the domestic elasticity, e.22Thusthe relative importance of foreign sources of technology
has been substantially increasing according to these estimates.
There is a lot of heterogeneity across bilateral relations in how the relative importance of specific
G-5 country technology sources has changed over time. For instance, Canada's only major source
of technology among the G-5 countries remains the United States. In other countries, the estimates
suggest large shifts in the relative importance of individual G-5 countries as foreign sources of tech-
nology. Figure 9 shows for instance that the U.S. has overtaken Germany as the major source of
foreign technology in Finland. The decline in the distance parameters means that the distribution
of foreign technology sources approaches that of the shares of the G-5 countries in total G-5 R&D.
Once the distance parameters are all equal to zero, geographic distance has ceased to play a role in
international technology diffusion, and all countries draw from a common global pooi of technology
which is replenished according to the R&D shares given in Table 2.
However, today geographic distance seems to be a major determinant of international technology
diffusion. In Finland, for example, Germany had still 29% of the total effective foreign R&D during
1983-95 even though Germany accounted only for circa 9% of G-5 country R&D during that period.
In contrast, Japanese R&D as foreign technology source in Finland was still negligible during 1983-95
according to my estimates, even though Japan accounted for 13% of all G-5 R&D. The situation
in many other countries is similar. Figure 10 shows the standard deviation across the G-5 country
shares in total effective foreign R&D for each of the nine countries. Except for Spain, the standard
deviation has declined in every country. For the European countries, this is primarily associated
with the declining importance of being close to Germany, which is accompanied by a decrease in
the relative importance of German R&D and an increase for that of the United States. However, if
22The former rises from 0.009 to 0.011, while the latter falls from 0.013 to 0.006.
22geography loses further in importance, the distribution of foreign technology sources will become less
equal again for the European countries, because if the distance parameters approach zero in the long-
run, the distribution of R&D shares will be less equal than it is right now.23 Thus, for some countries,
the slowly declining importance of geographic factors in technology diffusion is non-monotonically
related to the degree of dispersion in their G-5 technology sources.
In the following I examine the robustness of these findings. The distance effect estimates for
the sample of low-R&D industries in column 2 of Table 7 are similar and confirm an estimate of
the parameter b that is less than zero, consistent with less localization over time. The results in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 are based on the sample of European countries, and that with lagged
R&D, respectively. Also here the estimate of 'confirmsqualitatively the earlier results. Overall,
distance coefficients are estimated to fall (in absolute value) between circa 30% and 60% on average,
depending on the specification. One needs to be cautious though to not overinterpret the individual
parameter estimates of 6, in Table 7, because some appear to be fragile in the light of the earlier
estimates. In particular, some distance coefficients in column 1 of Table 6 do not lie in the interval
of the estimates from the two subperiods in column 1 of Table 7, suggesting that some part of the
variation in productivity levels identifies ,'y,and the 6g only jointly. Therefore, to analyze the
robustness of the less-localization result further, I have also estimated a specification where both 'y
and the distance parameters 5g may change over time. The results are very similar.24 In unreported
results, I have obtained the result that the degree of localization has fallen over time also using
unadjusted and partially adjusted TFP data, for choosing alternative R&D depreciation rates such
23The long-run standard deviation is about 0.233, calculated from the G-5 country shares in Table 2. Note that the
G-5 country shares in the global pool of technology change over time as well. From Table 3, e.g., U.S. R&D growth
over this period has been slower than in France, Germany, and Japan. This suggests that the long-run U.S. share in
G-5 technology might be below 61%, its value in 1980.
24The effective foreign R&D term is then y(1 + )T) (9€c5Se_69(1 Tt)D) .Ifthere is only a stronger effect
from G-5 R&D over time but no change in the degree of localization, one expects that ). > 0 but =0.For the
full sample (corresponding to column 1 in Table 7),Iestimate A =0.079and b =—0.561,suggesting that the
less-localization result is robust to allowing for a differential effect of foreign R&D over time independent of distance.
23as 0%, and for the alternative specification where effective foreign RkD is given by Sg6.Iwill
now turn to some concluding discussion of these findings.
4 Summary and discussion
I have analyzed the international diffusion of technology by estimating the spatial distribution of
productivity effects of G-5 country R&D spending in other OECD countries. This paper provides,
first, evidence suggesting that the international diffusion of technology is geographically localized in
the sense that the productivity effects of R&D are declining with the geographic distance between
sender and recipient countries. The average elasticity estimates of productivity with respect to
distance varies across specifications from —1% to —2.4%. Using these averages to evaluate a particular
bilateral effect, this suggests that Italy's productivity is 0.5 to 1.2 percent lower than Denmark's
because of less technological diffusion from the U.K., due to a fifty percent higher bilateral distance to
Italy compared to Denmark. This is a substantial effect and points to an important role for geographic
factors in determining the availability of technological knowledge across different countries.
Second, the degree of localization of technology diffusion has significantly declined over the sample
period. Again, estimates vary somewhat depending on specification. In the benchmark specification
of Table 7, the average elasticity of productivity with respect to distance falls from —2.4% during the
period of 1970-82 to —2.0% during 1983-95. This is a 20% smaller distance effect over a relatively
short period of time, and suggests that the importance of geographic factors is declining rapidly today.
While my estimates point thus in some ways to the demise of the importance of geographic distance,
in other ways I probably overestimate its importance. For instance, although it is plausible that U.S.
R&D is Canada's major foreign source of technology, my estimate of the U.S. share (exceeding 99%)
appears to be too high, because surely, Japan, Germany, France and the U.K. together contribute
24more than 1% to Canada's stock of foreign technology. Other evidence, including from case studies,
contradicts these findings.
Comparable results on the geography of technological diffusion from other work are scant at this
point. Hanson (1998) estimates the geographic scope of demand linkages by correlating county-level
wages with distance-weighted incomes in other U.S. counties. His results also imply a very high
degree of localization, in that case for goods trade.25 Nevertheless, the finding of strong geography
effects for technology diffusion is even more striking, because a priori, if anything can be moved
costlessly around the globe, it would be technological knowledge. Generally, the more knowledge-
intensive the products are, the less plausible is it to assume that the volume of transactions between
different locations has much to do with distance-related transport costs. Sending a software program
by email from Austin, Texas to Dallas costs essentially the same as sending it to Sydney. So why
are there strong location effects for technology diffusion?
One reason might be that my results will prove to be not robust in other samples, with different
data, or with different specifications. As data on a larger set of countries, especially outside Europe,
becomes available, it will be possible to re-examine the questions my work has tried to address. More-
over, it might be possible in the future to compute productivity indicesthat consistently account for
differences in human capital across countries and industries. In terms of specification, I have focused
here on international within-industry effects, while technology diffusion between industries—that is,
across technology space—might be important as well. Further, the temporal dimensionof technology
diffusion has been collapsed into one point in time in my analysis that focuses on contemporaneous
effects. While I have already presented results for a number of different specifications, these are
certainly possibilities the reader should keep in mind.
25For instance, a typical simulation based on Hanson's estimates implies that a 10% reduction in the total personal
income of the residents of Illinois reduces wages in counties circa 200 miles away by approximately1% and leaves wages
in counties 500 miles or more away essentially unchanged.
25Second, my empirical analysis abstracts from the heterogeneity of technological knowledge. From
previous analyses of the value of patents we know that most innovations are worth very little while
a few are worth millions of dollars. If the innovations that are diffusing internationally are those
which are relatively valuable,26 then the value-adjusted stock of Japanese technology in Canada, e.g.,
might be substantially higher than I have estimated above. A third reason of why there might be
comparably strong geography effects in technology diffusion as there are for goods trade could be
that in fact the localization of neither is primarily caused by physical, distance-related transaction
costs. As an alternative, Rauch (1999), e.g., presents a network/information cost-theory of trade
that might also have some relevance for the diffusion of technology. Future work will have to further
clarify what geographic distance means in economic terms. By providing estimates of its importance
for international technology diffusion, this paper makes some progress towards this goal. Other
research should also examine whether geographic effects are present in the diffusion of technology
among the G-5 countries, as well as in the diffusion of technology to less developedcountries.
From this analysis of technological knowledge spillover to nine OECD countries which are next to
the world's technology frontier, a picture emerges where national technological developments in these
countries have often ceased to play the most important role for their productivity. Effective German
R&D is often several times higher than domestic R&D for the European countries, for instance,
according to my estimates. There has been a trend towards the globalization of technology over the
sample period. At the same time, geographic factors leading to clusters of countries that have access
to a regional pool of technology are important today, and are likely to remain important for some
time to come.
26See, e.g., Eaton and Kortum (1999) who relate the probability of international technology diffusion to the value of
patents.
26Table I
Relative Country and Industry Size in terms of GDP
Country Symbol Total ManufacturIng (1980) RelatIve Size in Sample Relative Size mci. G-5
Million $ US 1990 (Percent) (Percent)
Australia AUS 54745 8.3 2.1
Canada CAN 72945 11.1 2.9
Denmark DEN 20827 3.2 0.8
Finland FIN 20878 3.2 0.8
Italy hA 270236 41.0 10.6
Netherlands NL 39096 5.9 1.5
Norway NOR 17792 2.7 0.7
Spain SPA 130753 19.8 5.1
Sweden SWE 31886 4.8 1.2
Sum of 9 Countries 659158 25.7
For reference:
France FRA 298530 11.7
Germany GER 350658 13.7
Japan JAP 332562 13.0
United Kingdom UK 212000 8.3
United States USA 778406 30.4
Industry ISIC Sum over 9 Countries Relative Size In Sample
Million $ US 1990 (Percent)
Food 31 96019 15.0
Textiles 32 77154 12.1
Wood 33 37767 5.9
Paper 34 60232 9.4
Chemicals 351/2 48945 7.7
Rubber 355/6 22361 3.5
Non-met Miner. 36 43257 6.8
Basic Metals 37 35949 5.6
Metal Products 381 54648 8.6
Machinery, lnstr.382/5 71180 11.1
El. Machinery 383 37358 5.8
Transportation 384 53819 8.4Table 2
Relative Country and Industry Size in terms of R&D
Country Symbol Total ManufacturIng (1980) Relative Size In Sample Relative Size md. G-5
MillIon $ US 1990 (Percent) (Percent)
Australia AUS 10232 9.1 0.7
Canada CAN 13777 12.3 0.9
Denmark DEN 3296 2.9 0.2
Finland FIN 3053 2.7 0.2
Italy ITA 32436 28.9 2.1
Netherlands NL 24708 22.0 1.6
Norway NOR 2955 2.6 0.2
Spain SPA 6398 5.7 0.4
Sweden SWE 15569 13.8 1.0
Sum of 9 Countries 112424 7.2
For reference: Relative Size In G-5
(Percent)
France FRA 98883 6.8 6.3
Germany GER 130143 9.0 8.3
Japan JAP 187597 12.9 12.0
United Kingdom UK 143304 9.9 9.2
United States USA 892037 61.4 57.0
Industry ISICSum over 9 Countiles Relative Size In Sample
MIllIon $ US 1990 (Percent)
Food 31 30338 1.9
Textiles 32 17276 1.1
Wood 33 5642 0.4
Paper 34 17397 1.1
Chemicals 351/2 232369 14.9
Rubber 355/6 36695 2.3
Non-met Miner. 36 21231 1.4
Basic Metals 37 45663 2.9
Metal Products 381 22566 1.4
Machinery, lnstr. 382/5 243046 15.5
El. Machinery 383 382195 24.4
Transportation 384 509971 32.6Table 3
Average Annual R&D Expenditure Growth, 1970-95
(percent)
By country By industry
AUS 6.53 Food 7.38
CAN 9.29 Textiles 6.64
DEN 7.06 Wood Products 8.57
FIN 4.84 Paper 5.45
ITA 9.75 Chemicals 8.03
NL 8.69 Plastics 7.09
NOR 7.29 Non-met. Mm. Prod. 5.10
SP 7.50 Basic Metals 7.14













Geographic Distance from Nine OECD Countries to the G-5Countries
In Miles
USA UK JapanGermany France Average
Australia 15958 17004 7966 16557 16943 14886
Canada 734 5367 10327 5857 5652 5587
Denmark 6518 957 8700 660 1028 3572
Finland 6938 1824 7826 1532 1912 4007
Italy 7222 1434 9867 1066 1108 4139
Netherlands 6198 359 9300 235 428 3304
Norway 6238 1156 8414 1048 1343 3640
Spain 6096 1265 10775 1421 1055 4123
Sweden 6641 1433 8180 1182 1544 3796
Average 6949 3422 9039 3284 3446 5228Table 5























































































* Dependentvariable is the multilateral TFP index as defined in equation (1). Standard errors in parentheses; /3
measuresthe effect of domestic R&D, 'ytherelative effect from G-5 R&D, and 5determinesthe distance effect (5>0is
consistent with localization); n =numberof observations, AIC =Akaike'sInformation Criterion, as defined in the text.Table 6









/3 0.050 0.034 0.023 0.049
(0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
'y 4.086 3.905 3.400 4.089
(0.060) (0.073) (0.068) (0.061)
i5us 0.326 0.331 0.204 0.326
(0.020) (0.008) (0.093) (0.078)
'5UK 0.665 0.560 0.303 0.592
(0.086) (0.087) (0.007) (0.124)
Sj 0.358 0.376 0.071 0.277
(0.079) (0.077) (0.017) (0.087)
o 0.214 0.156 0.500 0.229
(0.078) (0.066) (0.031) (0.050)
'5F 0.860 0.852 0.508 0.852
(0.040) (0.030) (0.021) (0.018)
n 2808 1872 2184 2700
R2 0.781 0.811 0.791 0.796
AIC -4.223 -4.323 -4.117 -4.261
*Dependent variable is the multilateral TFP index as defined in equation (1).Standard errors in parentheses; i
measuresthe effect of domestic R&D, ytherelative effect from G-5 R&D, and the 5g determine the distance effects
(ög > 0isconsistent with localization); n =numberof observations, AIC =Alcaike'sInformation Criterion, as defined
in the text.Table 7
Localization over time
Equation Low-R&D European Lagged
(5) industries countries R&D
/3 0.060 0.053 0.025 0.051
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.005)
-y 4.089 3.895 3.402 4.091
(0.060) (0.073) (0.068) (0.061)
6us 0.195 0.193 0.398 0.245
(0.018) (0.032) (0.075) (0.028)
6UK 0.554 0.524 0.275 0.484
(0.137) (0.081) (0.042) (0.090)
0.475 0.418 0.113 0.673
(0.108) (0.070) (0.049) (0.093)
öc 0.526 0.500 0.476 0.494
(0.087) (0.054) (0.015) (0.064)
0.836 0.817 0.524 0.838
(0.068) (0.046) (0.014) (0.026)
—0.505 —0.467 —0.297 —0.611
(0.049) (0.058) (0.020) (0.063)
n 2808 1872 2184 2700
R2 0.786 0.815 0.791 0.801
AIC -4.247 -4.341 -4.118 -4.287
*Dependentvariable is the multilateral TFP index as defined in equation (1). Standard errors in parentheses; /3
measuresthe effect of domestic R&D, 'ytherelative effect from G-5 R&D, and the 5g determine the distance effects
(6g > 0isconsistent with localization). The parameter bgovernsthe relative strength of localization between the
years 1970/82 and 1983/85 (b<0isconsistent with less localization over time); n =numberof observations, AIC =














Productivity comparisons with differences in labor and capital utilization across countries
and over time
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Changein average productivity ranking between 1970 and 1995
Averages across 12 industries
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Convergenceand divergence of productivity levels: With-in country variation versus between
country variation
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According to the following model, technology diffusion is related to international trade, which itself
is geographically localized. Consider two symmetric countries, home and foreign, that are located
at distance D from each other. In the home country, output is produced according to the familiar




, 0<a, <1, (6)
where A >0is a constant and K is capital. The d(i) are m(i) are domestic and foreign intermediate
inputs of variety i and i, respectively. At a given point in time, there is a range N (N) of domestic
(foreign) distinct input varieties. As in Romer (1990), these ranges are an index of the level of
technology in each country; they are increased through R&D spending. Assuming for simplicity that
a t9, each of the atomistic final output producers is demanding domestic and foreign intermediate
goods according to
=aAKlda_l*= aAK'm°1, (7)
where and j. is the price for any of the symmetric domestic and foreign intermediates, respectively.
Each intermediate is produced by a monopolist using labor. Due to international transport costs
as in Samuelson (1954), however, delivering x units of a foreign intermediate to the home country
requires sending off xeD units, which requires xeD of labor. Let w and w be the home and foreign
wage, respectively. One can show that optimal pricing of the monopolists implies =w/aand
=we'/a;further, the equilibrium quantities d and m are related by
m=deT. (8)Thus, when D > 0, the equilibrium usage of foreign intermediates is below that of domestic inter-
mediates. Assuming that the two countries have exogenous endowments of labor of L and L which
have no alternative usage, and using the fact that the countries are symmetric and hence m = m,





Let d(D) =(i+ e) ,(D)=eD(1+ and (D) (em/edf; together with symmetry,
this allows to write (6) as
= AK'°L [NI—a + N—(D)] , (10)
where A = Because 8/OD <0, equation (10) predicts that home output is falling, all else
equal, in the distance to the foreign economy.27 If total factor productivity is defined as F =
equation (10) leads to
F = in A + ln (Ni_a + N(D)),
which is shown in the text above. A complete description of this model requires to specify preferences
and the process determining NandN.Forthe purposes of this paper, this is not necessary, but
the interested reader might consult Romer (1990) as well as Aghion and Howitt (1992).28
This is a simple framework. Economic geography, through its effect on trade and technology
diffusion, is the only factor determining the spatial correlation of productivity, even though there
may be other factors affecting the spatial pattern of productivitylevels. There are also factors that
may influence international technology diffusion beyond geographic distance,such as a common lan-
27Here, output is falling in D because imported inputs areemployedat a lower equilibrium level due to the resource
costs of distance-related shipping. At the extensive margin, greater distance might also lead to a range of imported
inputs below N if international trade involves fixed costs; see Romer (1994).
28Multi-country models have been considered, e.g., in Eaton and Kortum (1999), Howitt (1998), and Keller (199gb).guage. Moreover, even though this model is highly stylized, the broad conclusion that an economy's
productivity is related to its geographic location is not unique to this trade-and-growth model: it
is also consistent with some recent models in the economic geography literature, e.g. Krugman and
Venables (1995). The analysis above is thus distinguished by a focus on geographic factors affect-
ing knowledge spilover, and it allows to see how these factors alone help to explain variation in
productivity levels across countries and over time.
B Estimation issues
B.1 Country as the unit of analysis
I consider technological knowledge diffusion among countries. In my sample, the latter are very
different from each other—strong heterogeneity—, and for an analysis at the industry-level, the current
data availability implies a relatively small sample.29 There are at least two important reasons,
however, of why an analysis of technology diffusion between countries appears to be the appropriate
first step in this research agenda: first, whether technology diffuses between two economies or not
is likely due to a significant degree to factors that typically operate at the country-level, such as
institutions, language, history, and culture.30 Second, economic policies, especially towards R&D
and technological capacity, are typically adopted at the national level. These two reasons make the
country level the natural unit of analysis for the purposes of this paper.
29 economicregions (for instance, U.S. states or European regions) as the unit of analysis might there-
fore seem to be an attractive alternative, but the quality of the data, especially on regional productivity figures,
would be considerably lower. Moreover, not only countries, but also regions within countries differ substantially in
their technology-creating capacity as measured by R&D expenditures (for the states of the U.S., see NSF 1999), and
technology absorption by other regions might be limited by the lack of adaptive R&D (e.g. Cohen and Levinthal 1989).
30This also points to the economic significance of national borders, the reasons of which are not very well understood
to date (see Helliwell 1998 for a recent synthesis).B.2 Simultaneity
There are numerous reasons of why the regressor function might not be orthogonal to the resid-
ual in the estimation equation. One possibility, strong inter-industry spillover, has already been
mentioned above. Also price shocks could cause the dependent and independent variables to be
jointly determined, if there is correlation between the R&D deflator and the output deflator. While
instrumental-variable estimation is a way of addressing simultaneity problems, a standard choice of
instruments for quantity series, namely factor prices, is not available for a broad sample as is used
in this paper. Patenting activity is another measure of technological activity which is known to be
correlated with R&D. However, patenting might be simultaneously determined with productivity as
well. In the absence of good instruments, I rely on my choice of specification to deal with possible
simultaneity problems.3'
A powerful element in my approach are the country-by-industry (C x I =9x 12) fixed effects
As mentioned above, the jcapturedifferences in the average productivity levels which might be
due to specific omitted variables. Moreover, the fixed effects also eliminate distance-related produc-
tivity differences between industries that are not caused by technology diffusion being geographically
localized. For instance, the composition of products within the two- to three-digit industries of my
sample might vary by country, and this could be correlated with the countries' location. Then, an
alternative to the localization of technology-hypothesis to explain a distance parameter estimate of
S > 0 is a technology matching hypothesis. According to that, the degree to which G-5 technology is
suited to the needs of the nine other countries is inversely related to geographic distance. Since Aus-
tralia is further away from the G-5 countries than Finland, e.g., this would mean that productivity
in Australia is lower than in Finland. For my purposes, this correlation would be spurious because
31 alsoGriliches and Mairesse (1998) who give an overview of a number of approaches whose main common goal
it is to identify production function parameters by avoiding simultaneity problems.it does not mean that productivity effects from foreign R&D decline with distance.Therefore, the
country-by-industry fixed effects are very important to obtain consistent estimates.32
C Data on labor inputs, physical capital, andgross production
Data on these variables comes from the OECD (1998a) STAN database. It provides internationally
comparable data on economic activity at the industry level for OECD countries.33 In constructing
the multi-lateral TFP variable I have used data on labor and physical capital inputs. The number
of workers engaged in country candindustry iattime t are taken from the STAN database. This
includes employees as well as the self-employed, owner proprietors and unpaid family workers. These
figures are adjusted by multiplying them by the average annual hours per manufacturing worker in
country c and time t to arrive at the labor input measure, denoted L. The data on annual hours
worked is from OECD (1999); a relatively small number of missing values has been interpolated.
Physical capital stock data is not available in the STAN database, but gross fixed capital formation
in current prices is. I first convert the industry investment flows into constant 1990 prices using
country- and industry-specific deflators that are derived from the STAN database.34 The capital
32
priceone pays for that is to give up exploiting any between-industry variation in the analysis.
33The STAN figures are not those submitted by the OECD member countries, but they are based on estimates by
the OECD, which tries to ensure greater international comparability. See OECD (1998a) for the details on adjustments
of national data.
34STAN contains data series on both value added in current and constant 1990 prices, which allows to deduce
deflator series. However, I found that these series varied implausibly much from year to year. Therefore, the deflators
to compute constant value investment and constant value production are smoothed; they are based on giving a weight
of 50% to industry-specific price movements, and the remaining 50% to price changes of total manufacturing in a given
country.stocks are then estimated using the perpetual inventory method, with
=(l—6)Kt_i+invct_-i,fort=2,...,26,c=1,...,9.
and (11)
k1 = (gj+6) ,c=1,...,9,
where industry subscripts have been suppressed. The variable mv is gross fixed capital formation in
constant prices (land, buildings, machinery and equipment), g is the average annual growth rateof
mv over the period 1970-1995, and 5 is the rate of depreciation for capital in country c.As far as
possible, I use country-specific depreciation rates, taken from Jorgenson andLandau (1993b), Table
A-3: Canada 8.51%, Italy 11.90%, and Sweden 7.70%. These numbers are estimates for machinery&
manufacturing in the year 1980. For the remaining six countries, the averageof the eight countries'
depreciation rates that are listed in Jorgenson and Landau (1993b) has beenused.
Capital is adjusted for differences in capacity utilization by first estimating asmooth output
series in Zt (from the regression 1nZjt =Ei+ (t+ Adjustedcapital is then35
Knit=* (1 + (lnZit
—lnZjt)),Vc,i,t.
Letthe parameter c be the share of the labor in total production costs. Followingthe approach
suggested by Hail (1990), the &s are not calcu'ated as the ratioof total labor compensation to value
added (the revenue-based factor shares), but as cost-based factor shareswhich are robust in the
presence of imperfect competition. Forthis I use the framework of the integrated capital taxation
model of King and Fullerton (see Jorgenson 1993, Fullerton and Karayannis 1993)and data provided
I impose a maximum absolute value on the adjustment term=(1nZt
—hiZj), mainly to avoid negative
capital stock estimates: when (1nZct —lnZt)> 0.8, 1 set=0.8, andwhen (1nZt —lnZct)<—0.8,I set
8cit= —0.8.in Jorgenson and Landau (1993b). The effective marginal corporate tax rate w is given by the wedge
between before-tax (p) and after-tax rate of return (p),relativeto the former
(12) p
Here, the variable of interest is p, the user cost of capital. It will be a function of the statutory
marginal tax rate on corporate income, available investment tax credits, the rates of depreciation,
and other determinants. In the case of equity financing, the after-tax rate of return will be =r+ ir,
where r is the real interest rate and r is the rate of inflation. Jorgenson (1993) tabulates the values for
the marginal effective corporate tax rate in Table 1-1. According to the "fixed-r" strategy, one gives
as an input a real interest rate r and deduces the tax rate. In this case, I use a value of r0.1, which,
together with the actual values of ir allows, using equation (12), to infer the user cost of capital,
p. From Jorgenson's Table 1-1 on w, I use the values on "manufacturing" (the 1980 values given
are used for 1970-1982 in the sample, the 1985 values for 1983-1986, and Jorgenson's 1990 values
are used for 1987-1991). This certainly introduces an error; in addition, the Jorgenson Table 1-1 is
derived from a "fixed-p" approach, as opposed to the "fixed-r" approach employed here. Further,
the results depend on, first, the chosen real interest rate, second, w varies by asset type, and third,
7 is a function of the way of financing (equity versus debt primarily). Hence, due to unavailability
of more detailed data, there are several shortcomings in the construction of the cost-based factor
shares. However, the chapter by Fullerton and Karayannis (1993) presents a sensitivity analysis in
certain dimensions that can be used to estimate the sensitivity of the estimated cost-based factor
shares. I have also experimented with different values for the real interest rate, and found that the
basic results do not depend on a particular value. The main advantage of using the cost-based factor
share approach is that it uses all data on the user cost of capital compiled in Jorgenson and Landau(1993a) while at the same time producing factor shares that are robust in theabsence of perfect
competition.




where wL are the constant price labor costs. Labor and capital inputs together with the factor shares
allow to construct an index of relative total inputs in 'cit—
in'cit —cit=*{cxjt + t] [lnLit —LtJ+ * [(1 —ait)+ (1 —t)J[lnKt — (14)
for all c,i, and t, where in L2 = lnLcit, lnKt = 1nKcjt, and Xjt = >ocit•The relative
TFP index is obtained by subtracting relative total input from relative output, see equation (1)in
the text.
D Data on R&D Expenditures
The R&D expenditure data comes from OECD (1998b). I have been able toobtain consistent data
for all twelve industries and the period of 1970-95 for fourteen countries.Even in these countries,
however, there is not necessarily a R&D survey in each year: inthe United Kingdom, for instance,
R&D surveys were held only every third year until well into the 1980s,and in Germany R&D data
is collected only bi-annually. I rely on the OECD estimatesof missing R&D expenditure data; the
OECD has developed these by cubic spline interpolation techniques.The OECD (1998b) publication
covers the years 1973-97; estimates for 1970-72 arebased on data in hardcopy versions of the OECD's
Basic Science and Technology Statistics. Expenditures qualify asR&D according to the OECD'sFrascati Manual definition.
The construction of the R&D stocks is based on data on total business enterprise intramural
expenditure on R&D (denoted Et);36 the OECD code for this series is BERD. The estimates are
available in constant 1990 $ U.S., using the OECD purchasing power parity rates for conversion. I






where the industry and country subscripts have been suppressed. The rate of depreciation of the
knowledge stock, ,isset at 0.1, and gRD is the average annual growth rate of S over the period
of 1970-1995. A higher (lower) choice of 5 reduces (increases) the rate of growth of the knowledge
stock over the period of observation. For some results presented in the text, I set 5 equal to zero,
assuming a zero rate of depreciation for R&D capital.
36
exceptionis Italy, where also extramural R&D expenditure is covered.